Reality, Part I

Peirce stumps for Reality-based decision-making; calls Descartes "French"

So earlier--or perhaps I should say "below"--I was referring to an article called "The Fixation of Belief", which is one of the couple of articles by C. S. Peirce that most philosophers have read, if they have read any at all. In that post I noted that Peirce thought that doubt (on any subject) is an uneasy state from which we attempt to escape, by means of enquiry. Enquiry produces belief, which assuages doubt, and can come from one of four methods; tenacity, authority, a priori, or pragmatism--which Peirce also calls the method of science.

It might be worth pointing out here that Peirce is widely acknowledged as the progenitor of a school of philosophy known as Pragmatism. Other adherents would include William James and John Dewey, as well as non-philosophers like Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (A proponent, predictably, of Legal Pragmatism.) The central principle of Pragmatism is contained in a paper called:

How to Make Our Ideas Clear

Today I wish to work my way up to the pragmatic maxim. I should stress that pragmatism has meant different things to different people. For Peirce, pragmatism was a logical maxim. His friend James called it a philosophy, but for ol' C. S., pragmatism was a logical tool that allows us to take clearness about concepts to what SportsCenter would undoubtedly call "the next level."

Which means what? Peirce digs logic like Dom Deluise at a clambake. I think I mentioned he had the recurring fantasy that people would pay him to teach them logic through the mail, an assumption demonstrating not so much a logical flaw as a complete misunderestimation of the logical needs of the public. N.b. the status of logic in America, c. 2005, e.g. In any case, Peirce felt that:

"The very first lesson that we have a right to demand that logic shall teach us is, how to make our ideas clear; and a most important one it is, depreciated only by minds who stand in need of it."

Really, you gotta love this guy. He is to snottiness what Karl Rove is to neck fat. For Peirce, there are three grades of clearness; he would call them grades of "clearness of apprehension." But only two had hitherto been investigated by the logiciancs. (Correcting the many inadequacies of ... well, everyone ... was Peirce's favorite pastime.)

I shall now digress. Anyone who has had the misfortune to sit through any Descartes, e.g., will recognize the first two grades of apprehension: The oft-imitated, never duplicated Cartesian comedy team of Clear & Distinct. I mentioned Descartes in the previous post. Descartes tried to put science on a firm foundation, so he cast about for things he knew must be true before experience. Claiming that (at least some) things that are clear and distinct could be known a priori, Descartes proceeded to identify several clear and distinct propositions by withholding his assent from everything (a process sometimes known as methodological doubt), and only assenting to those things he knew, ahead of time, to be certain. As you might suspect, if you remember Peirce's complaint about a priori "reasoning," we end up deciding that we should trust, well, the things we already think. But I'm not here to put the boot in. Check out the article if you want to watch C. S. whiffle-bat poor Rene into submission. Unilaterally, I might add.

Peirce must ruminate about clear, which is the first "degree of apprehension of clearness," and about distinct, which is the second, before he can add a third. This third degree of apprehension of clearness will become the driving force of Peirce's Pragmatism. If something is clear, then it is recognizable, as opposed to obscure. If something is distinct, it "contains nothing which is not clear." This is about as helpful as a [skunk]-flavored lollipop, so Peirce tweaks it, and claims that something is distinct if it is abstractly definable. Does this mean that clear things are not abstractly definable? Possibly. For certain Supreme Court Justices, e.g., pornography is clear but not distinct. (Did you click that link hopefully? Naughty! The answer was a couple paragraphs down, and was Mr. Justice Potter.)

After having his way with the allegedly hapless Descartes, Peirce sets his goal for the paper:

"The principles set forth in the first part of this essay lead, at once, to a method of reaching a clearness of thought of higher grade than the "distinctness" of the logicians."

Referring back to the first part of the essay [and I've never been entirely sure that Peirce didn't mean The Fixation of Belief], he points again to the process of uncomfortable doubt, banished once inquiry has attained belief. But as he notes:

"It was there noticed that the action of thought is excited by the irritation of doubt, and ceases when belief is attained; so that the production of belief is the sole function of thought."

Peirce does not mean doubt, here, with a big 'D.' He doesn't mean existential doubt, or necessarily big, philosophical questions, but rather any situation in which we attempt to determine a course of action. If I pull out a handful of change, e.g., I must decide which combination of coins to use, and probably have a number of options. This momentary hesitation while you work out what to do would count as doubt, as far as Peirce is concerned. (And there's nothing to say that you don't have a rule, or a habit that applies to change ... I keep quarters, and heave everything else into a tip-jar or charity collection--so I don't think about it.) Thought is *FOR* fixing belief, says Peirce. He also says that the pragmatic method, or the method of science, is the best way to do so. So perhaps we should work out precisely what that is. Clear? Crystal? Distinct? Pergamus.

The reason that I brought up the fact that you might not think about how to dispose of your change, because you might have a habit, is because Peirce thinks that beliefs are habits:

"And what, then, is belief? *** We have seen that it has just three properties: First, it is something that we are aware of; second, it appeases the irritation of doubt; and third, it involves the establishment in our nature of a rule of action, or, say for short, a habit."

So a belief, from this perspective, is "thought at rest", as I've mentioned. But it can also serve as a starting point for more inquiry ... which is, of course, more thought. But the big fat point here is that "the whole function of thought is to produce habits of action." Stay with me here, because the P-man is getting ready to swing away, and reveal his empirical streak.

Habits of action are ways in which we get around in the sensible world. (Sense-able?) This doesn't sound too startling, but the implications might rock your socks off. (Having said that, it occurs to me that Jack Black is channelling Peirce's arrogance, in Tenacious D, if not his overweening competence ...)

A Belief is a Habit of Action with regard to Sensible Effects.

If it is true that the function of thought is to produce belief, and beliefs are rules for action, then differences in meaning (distinctions between thoughts) are nothing more than differences in practices prompted. Grok it, yo.

Let's see what this means, by way of Peirce's example. Shrinking violet that he is, Peirce headed straight for the noncontroversial issue of what really happens during transubstantiation. Does your Welch's grape juice and Captain's wafer become the blood and body of Christ? Or merely symbolize it? Does this constitute a difference of opinion? Well, it seems like it, but Peirce calls "Shenanigans!" Because the sensible characteristics of the Welch's, or the wine, don't change:

"Thus our action has exlusive reference to what affects the senses, our habit has the same bearing as our action, our belief the same as our habit, our conception the same as our belief; and we can consequently mean nothing by wine but what has certain effects, direct or indirect, upon our senses; and to talk of something as having all the sensible characters of wine, yet being in reality blood, is senseless jargon."

So, that's disposed with. Which is nice ... if only the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 had known ... about the principle of pragmatism, which follows:

"It appears, then, that the rule for attaining the third grade of clearness of apprehension is as follows: Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object."

Clear is recognizable. Distinct is abstractly definable. But for something to reach the vaunted "third grade of apprehension of clearness", a brother's gotta work out all conceivable sensible effects. Earlier I mentioned Peirce's empiricism. For Peirce, any possible meaning, of any concept, must be tied to sensible effects. Nothing else counts.

Peirce goes on to apply this maxim of meaning--and for Peirce, it is a logical maxim--to a number of concepts, including weight, force, and hardness. But these are prelude; for what Peirce is working his way towards is a consideration of the application of the pragmatic maxim to the concept of Reality.